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Automatic Identification System (AIS) represents an important improvement in the 
fields of maritime security and vessel tracking. It is used by the signatory countries to the 
SOLAS Convention and by private and public providers. Its main advantage is that it can be 
used as an additional navigation aids, especially in avoiding collision at sea and in search and 
rescue operations. The present work analyses the functioning of the AIS System and the ways 
of exchanging data among the users. We also study one of the vulnerabilities of the System 
that can be abused by malicious users. The threat itself is analysed in detail in order to provide 
insight into the very process from the creation of a program to its implementation. 
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1. Introduction 
As a part of the process of increasing maritime security by improving vessel tracking, the 
Automatic Identification System (AIS) was introduced. After the implementation of the IMO 
Resolution A.917(22) [3] and according to the regulation of the international SOLAS 
Convention, an obligation to implant an AIS device was imposed on July 1 2002, for all 
international navigation ships over 300 gross tons as well as for all passenger ships. 
The implementation of the AIS System itself has brought many advantages in vessel 
tracking, search and rescue actions and maritime collision analyses. The device works in 
interaction with other navigation units on the ship that track the coordinates, speed and 
course, as well as other information used by the system. 
Every day we are witnesses to the automatization in maritime affairs and we rely on an 
ever increasing number of electronic navigation devices. Despite the fact that the system 
enables greater security and functions as a supporting device, we should not ignore its 
disadvantages. Due to the maritime infrastructure development, merchant marine is becoming 
one of the most important profit sources, both for the government and for the private sector. 
That attractive data becomes of interest to many criminal groups engaged in maritime 
industry. On the basis of our study [1] of the AIS System security evaluation, we are able to 
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see the weak points that could be used by the attackers in order to compromise the system. 
With further investigation we want to draw attention to the possible abuses of the system’s 
software. 
Furthermore, in Section 2 we explain the functioning of the system in order to delve into 
the methods of exchanging data between the ship and the coast station in the next section. In 
the main part of the study we focus on the threats that can be carried out by specialized 
software solutions and we show how one of the models can be created. The results of the 
study are presented in Section 5, together with the conclusions of the analysis. 
2. AIS System overview 
AIS standard can be found in two forms. One of them, Class A, is used on the SOLAS 
Convention vessels, while Class B is a more affordable choice destined for non-SOLAS 
vessels. The transponder of a Class A unit has one VHF transceiver, two VHF TDMA 
receivers, one VHF DSC receiver and connections with the vessel devices that use standard 
vessel communication IEC 61162/NMEA 0183 [5]. In order to synchronize time and obtain 
information on the location, the device uses accurate GPS time data. Other navigation 
parameters are obtained from the sensors aboard the vessel. 
 
Fig 1. System overview 
The emission from an AIS unit is autonomous and constant, and it uses two VHF 
frequencies: 161.975 MHz and 162.025 MHz Self-Organized Time Division Multiple Access 
(SOTDMA) is used for data exchange. It enables data emissions among multiple users via 
only one VHF channel. The location report emitted by one AIS station is integrated into one 
of the 2250 cells every 60 seconds. AIS stations are constantly synchronized in order to avoid 
information overlap in one cell. If the messages start to overload the network, the system 
automatically eliminates the more distanced stations in favor of those in closer proximity. 
The data exchange itself is based on the modulation defined by ITU Recommendations 
[2]. In Figure 1 we lay out a simple example of the process of exchanging data between 
vessels, coast stations and a control center, as well as their transfer to the network. 




The data exchanged between AIS stations can be static, dynamic, security or navigation 
related. During the installation of the system on a vessel, the static data that contain the MMSI 
(Maritime Mobile Service Identity) are manually set. MMSI is a nine-digit number that 
represents an identification mark of a vessel whose first three digits refer to its country of 
origin. Static data also include some basic information, like the IMO number, vessel type, 
length and width. The applicable dynamic data, updated automatically, provide information 
on the location, time, course and speed over ground, navigation status and other important 
information relevant for the maritime security. 
3. Data exchange method 
Regarding the structure of the AIS System, we notice that the standardized model is 
used. These models function on the basis of the data exchanged between coast AIS stations 
and control centers via the Internet. We see the same structure both in the public providers, 
like MarineTraffic.com, and the state ones, like Vessel Traffic Management and Information 
System (VTMIS). 
In the case of the Republic of Croatia there are 17 coast AIS stations connected to the 
main control center in Rijeka via 128Mbit/s permanent connection provided by the state 
communications provider [6]. The national control center in Rijeka gathers all the data from 
the coast stations, presents it, stores it and forwards it to the users. European Union member 
states are obligated to exchange data with the European exchange platform of maritime states 
called SafeSeaNet. The network enhances communication between the local and regional 
state units on one hand, and the center, on the other, gathering information that prevents 
maritime accidents, contamination of the sea and other factors important for the maritime 
safety. Figure 2 shows the components of the system in the Republic of Croatia. We can see 
how the data gathered on the coast station are interchanged via the network with the other 
components of the system. 
 
Fig 2. AIS system components in National Control Centre [6] 
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3.1 AIS data format 
For the exchange of data sentences between vessels and VTS a two-layer AIVDM 
protocol is used. AIVDM protocol defines 27 types of messages that can be exchanged and 
each of them has one specific purpose [7]. The outer layer of AIVDM protocol is a variation 
of the NMEA 0183 protocol that is used in standardized data exchange in the maritime 
navigation system [9]. 
From the above mentioned messages that can be exchanged, the important ones for our 
study are the first three which define the vessel location report. Among the others we can 
emphasize the message 24, which informs about the static data, and the message 21, that 
provides a report from the navigation instruments. 
Let us examine an example of an AIVDM sentence, coded according to the NMEA 
standard, that provides information about the location of a ship. 
Example: !AIVDM,1,1,,A,11mg=5@OD>17JD0I?f@72?wp0000,0*04 
In the body of the sentence the coded AIS data is the following part: 
11mg=5@OD>17JD0I?f@72?wp0000. In the NMEA coding for AIS every ASCII sign 
matches its special six-bit binary version [2]. After the decoding, we get a binary translation 
of the sentence, as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Presentation of the content of an AIVDM sentence 
Bits Bits value Parameter Value 
6 000001 Message ID 1 
2 00 Repeat indicator 0 
30 000111010110111100110100010101 MMSI number 123456789 
4 0000 Navigational status 0 
8 011111 01 Rate of turn +697.5 
10 0100 001110 Speed over ground 27.0 
1 0 Position accuracy 0 
28 0000100011101101001010000000 Longitude 15°36.0000'E 
27 001100100111110111001000000 Latitude 44°7.2000'N 
12 011100001000 Course over ground 180.0 
9 11111111 True heading 511 
6 111100 Time stamp 60 
2 00 Maneuver indicator 0 
3 000 Spare 0 
1 0 RAIM-flag 0 
19 0000000000000000000 Communication state 0 




3.2 Broadcast information 
Depending on its speed, an AIS unit on a vessel emits messages. This means that, if the 
vessel is anchored, it will emit a message every three minutes; if it is sailing at the speed of 14 
knots, every 12 seconds; and if the speed is over 23 knots, every 2 seconds [2]. The messages 
are received by the AIS stations on the coast and then forwarded to the providers via the 
Internet. During the transfer the TCP or UDP Internet protocol can be used, as well as the 
receiving IP address of the provider. Today, Marine Traffic and Vessel Finder are among the 
most popular public providers that have their own web sites with all the necessary 
information, but also enable the data to be interpreted by third-party programs or sites. A 
similar way of emitting data is used by the state providers, but the technical details regarding 
the receiving IP addresses are not publicly available. 
In the following section we would like to draw attention to the lack of security controls by 
the providers that receive AIVDM sentences [1]. The providers are not able to check the 
source that emitted the message and to see whether it is legitimate. This weak point can be 
found on every public provider and can enable deceptions malicious users can take advantage 
of. 
4. A software threat 
We have previously explained which types of messages can be exchanged via the AIS unit 
and we showed how they were coded. The characteristic that we will focus on in the AIS 
reporting system is the transfer of the above mentioned data onto AIS providers via the 
Internet. Such an approach in data collecting offers an insight into the situation at sea that is 
of crucial importance to VTS, harbormaster’s office and other participants relevant for the 
maritime traffic security. 
An AIS data manipulation can have a breach of the law as a result. The law states that the 
AIS data can serve as proof material in the offence procedure, as can be seen in the article 158 
subsection 5 of the Offence Law: “If, during their supervision, an authorized civil servant has 
noticed directly an action of committing an offence or has established it immediately using 
adequate technical devices and has made an official note or technical recording, the official 
note and the technical recording serve as proof material in the offence procedure” [18]. 
4.1 Threat review 
By the term “threat” we imply any disturbances that disable the timely functioning of the 
system and the credibility of its data. One of the attacks can be the creation of a false vessel 
that appears with the same static and dynamic data as a real one. An attacker can use the 
MMSI number of a real vessel and alter its data, for example its speed, course and 
coordinates. In this way we get a false location of the vessel and its parameters, which can 
lead to the alarming of the authorities, if the vessel is shown to be in a prohibited area. Such a 
possibility provides a wide range of malicious actions that an attacker could undertake. 
Using computer programmed algorithms, attackers can take control of the data of all the 
vessels in an area. The data regarding the transportation of dangerous cargo can also be 
falsified, which can directly violate the universally accepted regulations and standards, as well 
as the Croatian regulations on vessel-related contamination of the sea. Studying the 
bibliography available to the date, we can find out that one author has already brought up the 
question of the possibility of creating false data packages. These threats can be attributed to 
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the vulnerability of the AIS open communication system which does not use cryptographic 
methods to ensure communication security [19]. Using these kinds of deceptions, Somali 
pirates, for instance, can falsify data regarding a hijacked vessel so that it appears it is still on 
its planned course while it actually finds itself in a perilous situation. 
As we can see, potential attackers have a wide range of possibilities that can be used for 
malicious purposes. Their motivation can vary, depending on whether the attack is carried out 
by an individual or an organization. One can imagine that criminal organizations have a wider 
range of possibilities at their disposal, both when finances and manpower are concerned, 
which is why these attacks can be deemed more dangerous. One of the reasons for carrying 
out this kind of attack can be an intention to cover up a more serious attack. The attackers can 
manipulate the data so as to create a false location of a ship, in order to perform a real 
physical attack upon it. 
5. Programming software threats 
In this section we would like to show how to create a tool that can be used to disturb the 
transmission of the information via the AIS System, using the programming language C++ 
with standard libraries and a QT program framework that contains many libraries which are 
widely used in the creation of applications with graphic interface. 
5.1 Creation of the program 
In Table 1 we showed the elements of which an AIVDM sentence is composed, as well as 
the length and the value of each element. Furthermore, we had to create a function that would 
transform the input parameters into outcome content in binary form. In order to do so, we 
used the C++ library bitset that enables the storage of binary values within the variable. In this 
way, by entering the value of the MMSI number, we get its binary value of 30 bits. If its real 
binary value is not of 30 bits, the function bitset fills in the rest of the space with zeros in 
order to meet the established requirements. This is how we created the binary value of all the 
elements that an AIVDM sentence has to contain in order to report on a location, which was 
afterwards stored as string type information. An illustration of the function can be seen in 
Figure 3 where the income parameters are shown, together with the outcome parameter that 
the function produces. 
 
Fig 3. Function for coding an AIVDM sentence 




The next step is to create a NMEA sentence from the binary value, which was described 
in the former section. As we have explained, a special way of converting a binary number into 
an ASCII sign is used, where one sign does not contain the usual 8, but rather 6 bits. In order 
to get one ASCII sign, we take a six-bit message, which means that a generated message of 
168 bits corresponds to 28 signs. For one six bit long binary message we search the ASCII 
table and, excluding the first two figures, we calculate its decimal number value. If that 
number is higher than 39, we add 8, and if it is not, we add 48. 
 Example: We enter the binary value 010100 into the table and calculate its decimal value 
20. Since that decimal value is lower than 39, we add 8. Now using the number 28 we consult 
the table and take the sign with the corresponding decimal value “D”. 
The last thing we have to do is introduce the data into one of the providers using the UDP 
Internet protocol. This is performed by sending the created sentence to the receiving IP 
address and the provider’s port. The data concerning the public providers can be found on 
their official web pages. 
5.2 Performing an Experiment 
In order to administer a test, we will use the program we created for sending an AIVDM 
sentence to the public provider. We will use a technique of false representation and generate a 
false location and false data for a selected ship. After starting the program, we set the 
parameters which include the MMSI of the ship. The false AIVDM sentence is forwarded by 
the program to the MarineTraffic provider via the IP address and a determined port. The sent 
information can be seen on the official, publicly available page, as the Figure 4 shows. 
 
Fig 4. Results of the test 
We would like to point out that the infrastructure of the public providers that offer AIS 
services is in no way related to the AIS system applied by the states. These false data appear 
only on the page of the chosen provider and cannot cause safety threats. 
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6. Conclusion 
The abuse of the AIS System can result in serious problems in maintaining maritime 
security and the aim of this study was to draw attention to that. Nowadays the Internet offers 
easily reachable bibliography about the vulnerability of the system that can be used by 
potential attackers. We should be aware that, no matter the technological advancements used 
in everyday life, the importance of the human factor should not be ignored. The area of 
computer security in maritime affairs is a new discipline that is yet to find its place in the 
totality of the infrastructure. 
In order to act preemptively, this area of expertise should be included in the future seamen 
education. Today we still lack official solutions to the abuses of the AIS System. One 
suggestion [1] was to introduce the public key infrastructure (PKI) that uses asymmetric 
cryptography in order to protect the integrity of the data. Another option is to introduce 
various types of machine learning techniques in order to recognize anomalies [15]. 
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